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I. INTRODUCTION 
In The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, Benjamin Means 
aspires to lay the groundwork for a law of family businesses.1 Family-business 
law is not a “law of the horse,”2 but governs a distinctive factual context at the 
intersection of two important legal forms—the family and the business 
organization—each of which is animated by its own set of policies and 
regulated by its own set of rules. This article is another fascinating 
contribution to Means’s long-term project of rationalizing the law of family 
businesses. In this brief essay, I suggest that a workable family-business law 
along the lines suggested by Means is consistent with an overarching policy in 
the United States of promoting entrepreneurial action,3 and I evaluate the 
proposal against this policy goal, with particular attention to Means’s 
arguments in favor of “family-business defaults” and his concern over the 
potentially disruptive role of fiduciary law. 
                                                                                                                     
  Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
 1 Benjamin Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 675 (2014). 
 2 See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: 
Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 71, 79 (2008) (arguing that 
“the value of creating or maintaining a field of legal study turns on the distinctiveness of 
the factual context”). 
 3 D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2013). 
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II. FAMILY-BUSINESS LAW 
Family-business law is about the internal affairs of a business organization 
in which “effective control of the business rests in family hands and that at 
least two family members be involved as owners or managers.”4 When 
disputes arise in family businesses, courts strive to implement the relevant 
policies and apply the relevant rules, but the clash of family law and business 
law often creates confusion. As Means observes, “Whether the issue is 
divorce, inheritance, or the operation of a family trust that owns business 
assets, family law can have a considerable influence on business law 
outcomes.”5 The inconsistency of outcomes that typifies the status quo 
“interferes with rational business planning and invites arbitrage across 
doctrinal categories by sophisticated parties.”6 
Means proposes to address this set of problems by extending the 
contractarian model of business organizations to include marital agreements, 
trust instruments, and inheritance contracts among participants in the business 
organization.7 Placing family businesses on a contractual foundation should 
increase the predictability of outcomes, assuming that courts are reasonably 
consistent in discerning the expectations of contracting parties from explicit 
contracts and in applying appropriate default rules in the absence of explicit 
contracts. Even though “[f]amily objectives are not necessarily what a rational 
actor would formulate,”8 the effect of this enhanced predictability of outcomes 
should be to encourage the formation of family businesses.9 
III. ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION 
In arguing for predicable outcomes, Means is echoing the work of Max 
Weber,10 Willard Hurst,11 Douglass North,12 Hernando de Soto,13 Rule of Law 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Means, supra note 1, at 690. 
 5 Id. at 677. 
 6 Id. at 730. 
 7 Id. at 713. 
 8 Id. at 678 n.14. 
 9 Generally speaking, we assume that predictability mitigates the potential for 
opportunism, thus encouraging action. See generally D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, 
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (2009) (describing incomplete 
contract theory). 
 10 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 641–900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968). 
 11 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956). 
 12 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
 13 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5–6 (2000). 
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scholars,14 Legal Origins Theory,15 and others,16 who contend that within a 
“framework of reasonably predictable consequences,” private actors are 
“likely to cultivate boldness and energy in action.”17 Max Weber famously 
made the case for predictable legal outcomes as a foundation for economic 
development, asserting that “the increasing calculability of the functioning of 
the legal process . . . constituted one of the most important conditions for the 
existence of . . . capitalistic enterprise.”18 
Stability is not the only attribute of a legal system that encourages 
entrepreneurial action. Novelty is a distinguishing attribute of entrepreneurial 
action,19 and novel things or novel behaviors “stretch the fabric of law.”20 
Legal systems that adapt well to novelty, therefore, should have an advantage 
in economic development. Legal Origins Theory embraces this adaptability 
hypothesis,21 holding that “legal traditions differ in their ability to evolve with 
changing conditions and legal traditions that adapt efficiently to minimize the 
gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system’s 
capabilities will foster financial development more effectively than more rigid 
systems.”22 
The need for stability and the need for adaptability are in tension. As noted 
by Andreas Engert and Gordon Smith, “the more responsive a legal system, 
the less people can rely on legal authority to predict how the law is going to 
deal with their behavior.”23 The tension between stability and adaptability can 
be reconciled by private ordering. Where the stability of a legal system 
emboldens planning, contracting parties can adjust their relationships to 
account for new behavioral or technological developments. Thus, a legal 
system that exhibits stability in positive law encourages private ordering, 
which is the locus of adaptability. This is consistent with Means’s aspirations 
for contractual default rules, which “could serve as a resource for the parties, 
generating a set of preferred outcomes and facilitating more particular 
                                                                                                                     
 14 E.g., John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100 
(2007). 
 15 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285, 286 (2008). 
 16 See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916, at 179 (1963); 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON 
LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660, at 3–13 
(2008). 
 17 HURST, supra note 11, at 22. 
 18 WEBER, supra note 10, at 883. 
 19 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74–76 
(Redvers Opie trans., 1934).  
 20 Andreas Engert & D. Gordon Smith, Unpacking Adaptability, 2009 BYU L. REV. 
1553, 1554. 
 21 See La Porta et al., supra note 15, at 326. 
 22 Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. 
COMP. ECON. 653, 655 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 23 Engert & Smith, supra note 20, at 1561. 
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bargaining.”24 
IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Promoting entrepreneurial action is a fundamental goal of the U.S. legal 
system,25 and family businesses are an important source of entrepreneurial 
activity. Indeed, Means begins his article by noting, “Most U.S. businesses are 
family owned.”26 We could imagine various incentives to encourage the 
formation of family businesses, but Means has chosen to focus on issues 
relating to the internal affairs of the business organization. It is hard to imagine 
a better starting place, as the formation of firms is fundamental to the 
promotion of entrepreneurial action. An entrepreneurship scholar noted 
perceptively, “At the most general level, entrepreneurship is the creation of 
value through the creation of organization.”27 
Broadly speaking, governments have two strategies for facilitating or 
impeding the formation of firms: reducing burdens or increasing subsidies.28 
These strategies are often associated with the taxation system, but many forms 
of regulation impose costs on businesses, and many features of the legal 
system act as a form of subsidy for business transactions.29 For example, 
modern legal systems facilitate the creation of firms by providing a range of 
off-the-shelf business forms, which offer easy access to governance rules and 
(usually) limited liability for the firm’s owners. These business forms provide 
a set of default rules that can be tailored to the particular needs of the 
participants. 
Firms are legal instruments that grease the wheels of entrepreneurial 
action, not only through default rules but through the flexibility enabled by 
fiduciary law. Constructed on a foundation laid by the law of agency,30 which 
enables the entrepreneur to appoint representatives to act on the entrepreneur’s 
behalf,31 firms empower entrepreneurs to get more things done.32 As the price 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Means, supra note 1, at 679. 
 25 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 1536. 
 26 Means, supra note 1, at 676. 
 27 BARBARA J. BIRD, ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR 3 (1989). 
 28 André van Stel et al., The Effect of Business Relations on Nascent and Young 
Business Entrepreneurship, 28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 171, 171 (2007). 
 29 See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 1551 (observing that the “state’s role [in] 
secur[ing] property rights and reduc[ing] the risks associated with venturing [is] . . . a form 
of subsidy for business transactions” (footnote omitted)). 
 30 See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 54 (2013) 
(“Firms of any complexity beyond a single individual cannot exist without the law of 
agency.”). 
 31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Agency is the 
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to 
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to 
the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
The law of agency is recognized by all modern legal systems. See W. Müller-Freienfels, 
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of this power, the law of agency demands that the entrepreneur be subjected to 
potential liabilities, including both outward looking liabilities (between the 
entrepreneur and third parties) and inward-looking liabilities (between the 
entrepreneur and another participant in the firm).33 Thus, embedded within the 
entrepreneur’s decision to create a firm is a (perhaps unconscious) decision to 
yield some control to other participants in the firm and to accept responsibility 
for their actions.34 Both default rules and fiduciary law facilitate this 
delegation of authority. 
V. DEFAULT RULES 
Placing all of this in the context of a family poses special challenges for 
the participants. As noted by Means, “When parents and children are also 
coworkers, connections rooted in family life must be adjusted to meet the 
obligations of the workplace.”35 Typical entrepreneurs concerned about having 
responsibility for the actions of their representatives may expend resources to 
incentivize and monitor the performance of those representatives,36 but these 
expenditures may seem unnecessary in family businesses, where family ties 
“establish a background of trust that can reduce the transaction costs of 
forming and operating a firm.”37 
                                                                                                                     
Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 165 (1957) (“Agency is recognized in all modern 
legal systems as an indispensable part of the existing social order.”). 
 32 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 132 (Routledge 
5th ed. 1976) (1942) (observing that entrepreneurship “consists in getting things done”). 
On the benefits of agency, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through 
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1636 (1999), observing that “[h]iring an agent simply 
allows us to do more.” 
 33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (“Agency . . . entails inward-
looking consequences, operative as between the agent and the principal, as well as 
outward-looking consequences, operative as among the agent, the principal, and third 
parties with whom the agent interacts.”). 
 34 These are costs that are distinctive to a firm, as opposed to transactions through 
markets. In both firms and markets, the entrepreneur must pay for services, expend 
resources for supervision, and protect against self-interested behavior of the other party. 
The firm is distinctive from markets because the entrepreneur grants discretion over firm 
resources to other participants in the firm, who then become fiduciaries of the firm. See D. 
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1403 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Critical Resource Theory] (observing that “a fiduciary 
exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary, whereas 
most contracting parties exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance 
under the contract”). 
 35 Means, supra note 1, at 692. 
 36 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“The 
principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the 
agent.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 37 Means, supra note 1, at 709. 
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Of course, the law of business organizations provides additional comfort. 
With regard to outward-looking liabilities, all modern legal systems offer 
firms with limited liability, which caps financial liability at the value of the 
entrepreneur’s investment in the firm.38 With regard to inward-looking 
liabilities, we rely heavily on a robust fiduciary law to constrain participants in 
a firm. In the end, however, Means argues that the primary bulwark against 
opportunism in the family firm is contract: “because the economic concerns of 
business and family do not reside in separate spheres, contractual adjustments 
can help to clarify the parties’ expectations.”39  
Means examines marital agreements,40 trust instruments,41 and inheritance 
contracts,42 all of which may provide explicit guidance in dispute resolution. 
The more ambitious part of his paper, however, is the last section, which 
proposes the development of default rules and interpretive principles 
consistent with the parties’ business and family relationships. His decision to 
promote the use of default rules seems natural, given the contractarian frame 
of the overall approach, but the choice of default rules represents a conscious 
rejection of mandatory rules that are often imposed in family-business cases 
currently. For Means this is pragmatic decision to elevate the expectations of 
the participants in the family business,43 but it also serves to encourage 
entrepreneurial action. 
Legal commands take the form of rules or standards.44 The archetypal rule 
is a numerical speed limit, whereas the exemplary standard requires 
“reasonable and prudent” driving.45 Lewis Kaplow famously described the 
                                                                                                                     
 38 See World Bank Grp., Entrepreneurship Dataset, DOING BUSINESS, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship/ [https://perma.cc/7DN7-
N5PA; https://perma.cc/J4UR-SMSS] (explaining on the “Methodology” page that the data 
was collected from “newly registered companies with limited liability (or its equivalent)” 
in 136 countries for the period 2004–2012). 
 39 Means, supra note 1, at 710. 
 40 Id. at 717 (“[N]o family-business plan is complete unless it takes into account 
possible disruptions of family relationships, including divorce.”). 
 41 Id. at 718 (“[W]hen trust law overlaps with business-organization law, the vital 
question is whether there is some appropriate mechanism for coordinating the parties’ 
rights and obligations.”). 
 42 Id. at 721 (“[P]rivate ordering regarding the transfer of family wealth can establish 
the functional equivalent of a work-to-own employment agreement.”). 
 43 Id. at 731 (“Ultimately, the goal is to support the voluntary participation of family 
members in a shared venture by protecting their expectations.”). 
 44 The reduction of legal commands to two types is a rather recent conceptualization. 
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1685–87 (1976) (matching “two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with 
substantive issues, which I will call individualism and altruism,” with “two opposed modes 
for dealing with questions of the form in which legal solutions to the substantive problems 
should be cast,” namely, rules and standards). 
 45 See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. 
REV. 155, 155–56 (1999) (describing Montana’s experience in moving from a rule to a 
standard). 
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difference between rules and standards as “the extent to which efforts to give 
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act.”46 A legal 
policymaker who is keen to promote entrepreneurial action should generally 
prefer default rules, which imply the possibility of waiver to account for 
tailored deviations from the normal form of organization. The superiority of 
this form of regulation over mandatory rules in the family-business context is 
clear, as mandatory rules entrench a particular vision of the interaction of 
family and business that undoubtedly would conflict with the preferences of 
many.  
It has also been argued that default rules are generally preferable to 
standards in promoting action because rules reduce uncertainty.47 In the case 
of entrepreneurial action, certainty is not necessarily a virtue, as an innovative 
challenge to the status quo may be expressly prohibited by the default rule, and 
the waiver may be difficult or expensive to obtain. But default rules probably 
make more sense in the family-business context, where the most salient 
problems do not concern innovation, but integration of the family into the 
business. 
VI. FIDUCIARY LAW 
Contracts play an important role in governing family businesses, but 
fiduciary relationships have a distinctive structure, relying partially on the 
logic of contract and partially on the logic of property.48 This is easily seen in 
the context of family trusts, which often are used in the family-business 
context to control the family-business assets.49 The crucial feature of family 
trusts—indeed, of all fiduciary relationships—is the exercise of authority by 
the fiduciary (trustee) over resources belonging to the beneficiaries. While the 
beneficiaries and fiduciary often have a contractual relationship in the form of 
a trust instrument, the duties imposed on the fiduciary are designed to protect 
the resources of the beneficiaries.50 
Because fiduciaries exercise their discretion over the trust assets in the 
                                                                                                                     
 46 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
560 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
 47 John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (1984). 
 48 See D. Gordon Smith, Firms and Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND 
FIDUCIARY LAW (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript  
at 2), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729657 [https://perma.cc/S89V-RQEP] [hereinafter Smith, 
Firms and Fiduciaries] (“[W]hile some features of fiduciary relationships are traceable to 
the logic of contract and some features are traceable to the logic of property, fiduciary 
relationships are unique hybrid institutions . . . .”). 
 49 Means, supra note 1, at 699 (“[T]he family owners might create a trust to effectuate 
a transition, because it is possible to allocate company stock and managerial control to one 
or more members of the family without depriving other family members of business 
profits.”). 
 50 See Smith, Firms and Fiduciaries, supra note 48. 
38 A RESPONSE TO BENJAMIN MEANS [2016 
face of incomplete trust instruments,51 beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships 
are vulnerable to opportunism. The potential for opportunism in the fiduciary 
context—as opposed to a relationship of arm’s-length contracting parties—is 
particularly acute because the fiduciary is authorized to exercise discretion 
over resources belonging to the beneficiaries, whereas “contracting parties 
exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance under the 
contract.”52 The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to sacrifice their own self-
interest on behalf of the beneficiaries of the duty to protect those beneficiaries 
from opportunism by the fiduciaries.53 
The duty of loyalty is common to all fiduciary relationships,54 but courts 
tailor the duty to specific contexts. In the family trust context, the trustee has a 
“duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries,” and to 
“deal fairly” with the beneficiaries.55 This duty is said to be “strict,” meaning 
that the trustee is prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve a 
conflict of interest, unless, among other things, the trustee receives court 
authorization, the terms of the trust expressly authorize such transactions, or 
the beneficiaries consent to such transactions.56 In these circumstances, “a 
trustee [still] violates the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries by acting in bad 
faith or unfairly.”57 
Means worries about potential conflicts between the fiduciary duty of a 
trustee and the fiduciary duty of a business manager.58 According to Means, 
“the default duty of loyalty owed by a trustee requires disgorgement of all 
profits, even if the dealings were fair,” while a controlling shareholder “is 
entitled to benefit from the share ownership as long as any self-interested 
transactions are fair to the other shareholders.”59 Means correctly observes, 
“The inconsistency of fiduciary obligations becomes especially problematic 
when a family member is empowered as trustee to manage a family business 
for the benefit of other members of the family.”60 
While Means would rely on the contractual conception of the firm to 
clarify the trustee’s role in these circumstances,61 the fiduciary law governing 
                                                                                                                     
 51 See D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 
615–16 (2014). 
 52 Smith, Critical Resource Theory, supra note 34, at 1403. 
 53 Id. at 1407. 
 54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Despite 
the differences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one 
characteristic is common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a 
duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.”). 
 55 Id. § 78. 
 56 Id. § 78 cmts. c(1), c(2) & c(3). 
 57 Id. § 78 cmt. c(2). 
 58 Means, supra note 1, at 700 (“In trust-controlled businesses, the law of trusts 
supplements and can even supersede otherwise applicable business law.”). 
 59 Id. at 718. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 719. 
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trustees makes allowance for these sorts of inherent conflicts of interest. As 
noted in the foregoing discussion of general fiduciary principles in the trust 
context, notions of “fairness” infuse fiduciary law, but the trustee’s duty of 
impartiality (mentioned briefly by Means as a limit on the “beneficiary’s 
practical ability to challenge trust distributions”62) is a doctrine that seems 
specially designed to facilitate action. Whenever a trust has two or more 
beneficiaries, as is often the case in family businesses, the trustee has a duty of 
impartiality with regard to those beneficiaries.63 The duty of impartiality is 
said to be an “extension” of the duty of loyalty,64 but impartiality is different 
from the traditional duty of loyalty in an important way. As illustrated in the 
following diagram, the duty of loyalty regulates vertical conflicts between the 
trustee and the beneficiaries, while the duty of impartiality regulates horizontal 
conflicts between two or more beneficiaries. 
Figure 1: Duty of Loyalty and Duty of Impartiality 
Trustee   
 
 
 
 
Duty of Loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
Beneficiary  Beneficiary 
 Duty of Impartiality  
 
The duty of impartiality applies to all of the decisions of a trustee, from 
the making or retention of investments to the management of trust property to 
the discretionary distribution of trust funds.65 Trust beneficiaries often have 
competing economic interests, and when they do, the issue of impartiality is 
unavoidable. Impartiality does not connote strict equality among the 
beneficiaries, but the trustee is to act without “personal favoritism or animosity 
toward individual beneficiaries.”66 In balancing the competing interests of the 
beneficiaries, the trustee may “reasonably reflect any preferences and priorities 
that are discernible from the terms, purposes, and circumstances of the trust 
and from the nature and terms of the beneficial interests.”67 
                                                                                                                     
 62 Id. at 701. 
 63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 64 Id. § 79 cmt. b. 
 65 Id. § 79 cmt. a. 
 66 Id. § 79 cmt. b. 
 67 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Recognizing the difficult position of the trustee with respect to the duty of 
impartiality, trust law allows for a “range of . . . reasonable fiduciary 
judgment.”68 Fiduciary duty is a “doctrine of last resort,” meaning that it is 
“activated only when all other potentially applicable commands from 
constitutions, statutes, regulations, ordinances, common law decisions and 
contracts have been exhausted.”69 In the family trust context, “a power is 
discretionary except to the extent its exercise is directed by the terms of the 
trust or compelled by the trustee’s fiduciary duties.”70 Courts review a 
trustee’s exercise of discretion under an “abuse of discretion” standard.71 An 
abuse of discretion occurs when decisions by the trustee are made in bad faith 
or with improper motive.72 Evidence of such action is that a decision of the 
trustee is “beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.”73 Generally 
speaking, therefore, “judicial intervention is not warranted merely because the 
court would have differently exercised the discretion.”74 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Entrepreneurial action requires organization, and the locus of organization 
is often the family. In his latest paper on “family-business law,” Benjamin 
Means offers an original, challenging, and provocative new perspective on 
family businesses. The thesis—that “a firm includes not just business 
contracts, but all bargains among participants that affect the business 
enterprise”75—seems, at first glance, rather obvious, but Professor Means 
takes pains to explain how the contract-based nature of business relationships 
often is in tension with the status-based nature of families. He argues 
simultaneously that family businesses are deeply contractual, even though 
family members should not be forced “to bargain at arm’s length and to 
rethink all aspects of their mutual relationships.”76 He ultimately concludes 
that our legal system should attempt to fulfill the expectations of the relevant 
parties in resolving disputes by developing “family-business defaults.”77 
Although I endorse this proposal, I also defend the flexibility and ingenuity of 
fiduciary law in resolving disputes in a manner that promotes action. 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Id.  
 69 D. Gordon Smith, Doctrines of Last Resort, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS 
SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY 426, 427 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013). 
 70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. a. 
 71 Id. § 87. 
 72 Id. § 87 cmt. c. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. § 87 cmt. b. 
 75 Means, supra note 1, at 678. 
 76 Id. at 712. 
 77 Id. at 723–30. 
